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"BUILDING UP" CHINA'S CONSTITUTION:
CULTURE, MARXISM, AND THE WTO RULES
M. Ulric Killion*
I. INTRODUCTION
"SOME" RESOURCES FOR "SOME" REFORMS

During the late Qing Dynasty (1636-1911), China struggled
with the debate of reformist policy versus dynastic rule. Then,
during the post-Qing period, the debate evolved to one that centered
on reformist policy versus revolution.' Following the 1949 founding
of the People's Republic of China, the prominent issue became
economic construction or reforms. During these debates, the issue of
legal reforms, like traditional culture and society, suffered relegation
to minimum importance. 2
It would not be until the eve of the infamous Great Cultural
Revolution (1966-1976) that China's polity, the Chinese Communist
Party ("CCP"), would give serious consideration to modernizing
China's legal system or implementing legal reforms in addition to
economic reforms In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th
Committee of the Communist Party Congress ("CPC") adopted a
policy of restoring the construction of a socialist legal system and
democracy. 4 However, unlike the proposed economic reform and
opening of the economic infrastructure, the reform of China's legal

* B.S. Econ., Doctor of Law, J.D., Visiting Professor of International Law, Shanghai
International Studies University.
1. See generally Wang Qisheng, "Revolution" and "Counter-Revolution ": Interaction
Among the Three Major PoliticalParties in China in the 1920s, ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE

[SOC. SC. CHINA], Winter 2004, at 79 (discussing the revolutionary discourse advanced by the
three major political parties during the post-Qing period).
2.
SHEHUI
3.
4.

See Chen Sixi, The Gradual Reform of the Electoral System in China, ZHONGGUO
KEXUE [SOC. SCI. CHINA], Spring 2004, at 95.
Id.
Id.
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system and democracy would experience a delay as China's polity

prioritized economic reforms.
6
China's accession to the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
would again direct attention toward legal reforms. Although China

now recognizes an obligation and need to reform its legal system, a
well-established socialist market economic system requires a wellestablished socialist market legal
economic legal system.7

system or socialist market

The policy of restoring the construction of a socialist legal
system

corresponds

with

the

early

Chinese

Communists

(commencing in the 1920s) and now the CCP's attempt to finalize
the localization of Marxism to the realities of traditional culture and
society.8 This, however, presents issues of a modem China; although

China appears willing to commit to legal reforms, it is only
committing "some" resources for "some" legal reforms such as
"some" new legal propositions or laws. 9 These reforms all challenge
ideal constitutionalism, rule of law, independent judicial review,

WTO rules and standards, and traditional culture and society
(predominantly traditional Confucianism).

5. See, e.g., Edward Cody, China's Premier Calls Democracy a Distant Goal, WASH.
POST, Feb. 28, 2007, at A13; Li YongYan, China Ready for Democracy in 1940s, Not Today,
ASIAN TIMES ONLINE, May 11, 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FEllAd04.html
(arguing that despite China's economic modernization, Chinese government officials refuse to
adopt a system of universal suffrage).
6. Protocol on the Accession of the People'sRepublic of China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001)
[hereinafter Protocolon Accession].
7. Wang Baoshu, China's Accession to the WTO and the Building of a Socialist Market
Economic Legal System, in CHINA: ACCESSION TO THE WTO AND ECONOMIC REFORM 338
(Wang Mengkui ed., Foreign Language Press 2002).
8. Religious Freedom in China: Hearing Before the Cong.-Executive Commission on
China, 108th Cong. 14-15, 24 (2004); Dep't of Propaganda of the Cent. Comm. of the Chinese
Communist Party, No. 13, Notice on Further Strengthening Marxist Atheism Research,
Propaganda and Education (May 27, 2004), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/
hearings/ 11 1804/Fu.php; Zou Shipeng, Localization of Marxism in China and the Constructionof
China's Modernity, ZHONGUO SHEHUI KEXUE [SOC. SCI. CHINA], Summer 2005, at 12; Marxist
Academy Founded in China, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 27, 2005, at 2; New Learning Center to
Promote Marxist Theory, Cultural Liberalization Inches Forward, CHINA REFORM MONITOR
(Am. Foreign Policy Council, Wash., D.C.), Jan. 13, 2006, available at http://www.afpc.org/crm/
crm6l2.shtml.
9. WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review: People's Republic of China, at 34 n. 24,
delivered to the Trade Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/S/161 (Feb. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Trade
Policy Review Report] ("[B]etween 1999 and 2003, 17 laws were revised; 63 administrative
regulations were issued, amended or abolished; and 34 State Council decrees were abolished.").
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Western experts who praise China's progress in modem legal
reforms are either unaware or willing to deny that Marxism is still
the subject of theoretical discourse within and without the halls of
both Chinese academia and Western academia.' ° In terms of ideal
constitutionalism, legal reforms that focus on Marxism rather than on
the domestic needs of China's citizenry result in a policy of pursuing
minimum compliance with the WTO standards, such as the WTO
rules and Trade Policy Review Mechanism ("TPRM") intended to
promote the development of a sound legal system, including judicial
review." The localization of Marxism presents issues of whether
China's model of constitutional government rises to the level of a
stage of legality where citizens and other legal persons, such as
foreign exporters, investors, and transnational corporations, are
protected from the arbitrary exercise of government power, while
also enjoying legally based civil, both economic and non economic,
liberties that can be enforced pursuant to the rule of law in a court of
law. The measure of constitutionalism or the state of legality may
ultimately be contingent on a policy of committing "some" resources
for "some" legal reforms, such as "some" new legal propositions or
laws.
Part II of this Article presents an introduction to the Western
ideal constitutional state, rule of law state, and state of legality as
well as an introduction to the WTO rules and standards for sound
legal systems and judicial review. Part II continues by introducing
the history of traditional culture and law by focusing on the influence
of traditional culture (predominantly traditional Confucianism and
legalism) on an earlier development and evolution of positive law in
antiquity. This Article then briefly introduces the Constitution of the

10. See, e.g., Brett Williams, The Influence and Lack of Influence of Principles in the
Negotiationfor China's Accession to the World Trade Organization, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 791, 799 (2001) (demonstrating that although Marxist ideologies have become less
important in the new era, students "are still well educated in Marxism and Leninism").
11. Protocol on Accession, supra note 6, at paras. 2(A)3, 2(D); General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade art. X, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT];
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
art. 13, available at http://wto.org/English/docs-e/legal-el9-adp.pdf (Judicial Review);
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]; Agreement Establishing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism,
Annex 3, WTO Agreement supra [hereinafter TPRM]. The Transitional Review Mechanism or
process is unique to China and is also required by paragraph 18 of the Protocol on Accession.
Protocolon Accession, supra note 6, para. 18.
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People's Republic of China ("1982 Constitution"), 2 Chinese
constitutionalism, and some of the problems associated with China's
model of constitutional government.
Part III of the Article analyzes the problems associated with
China's 1982 Constitution, the constitution in action and constitution
intext, extra-constitutionalism in practice, Marxism and economic
determinism, Marxism as the path to modern legal reforms, and
China's attempts to finalize the localization of Marxism to the
realities of traditional culture and society. This Article concludes
with a discussion of the inadequacies of Marxism and economic
determinism, as opposed to the WTO rules and standards or even
traditional culture and society, in promoting in China a more
Western constitutional design, rule of law, and independent
judiciary.
II. CONSTITUTIONS, RULE OF LAW AND CULTURE
A. Modern States of Legality

The rule of law is neither a rule nor a law, rather "a doctrine of
political morality which concentrates on the role of law in securing
the correct balance of rights and powers between individuals and the
state in free and civilized societies."' 3 In terms of the Western
Enlightenment, and its subsequent interpretations, the potential of
democracy is contingent on a state embracing the rule of law or state
of legality. Democracy, as the presumed greater good, can only
develop to the extent that law guarantees the rights of citizens, such
as civil rights and political freedoms. The road to justice depends on
the ability of citizens of a state to speak freely and publicly about any
experiences of injustice. For instance, in Germany, a state of legality
is a Rechtsstaat (literally, a law-based state, constitutional state, or
state of legality), where the rule of law restrains the exercise of state
power or government power. 4 In 1832, the concept of Rechtsstaat

12. XIAN FA (1982) (P.R.C.).
13. ALEX CARROLL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 18 (Law Press 2002);
see also Martin Kriele, Human Rights and the Separation of Powers, in THE RULE OF LAW 232
(Josef Thesing ed., 1997); Jiang Shigong, The End of Legal Transplantation,ZHONGGUO SHEHUI
KEXUE [Soc. SCI. CHINA], Autumn 2004, at 160.
14. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional
Democracy, 74 S.CAL. L. REv. 1307, 1318-19 (2001).
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first appeared in the German context in contrast to an autocratic
police state. 5 A state of legality is also characteristic of other
Western legal systems, such as the Anglo-American rule of law and
the French btat de droit. Germany provides a model constitution for
the world because its courts have exclusive power to invalidate laws
on constitutional grounds. 6 Citizens receive protection from the
arbitrary exercise of government power or authority, while also
enjoying legally based civil liberties and freedoms that are
enforceable pursuant to the rule of law in a court of law. All are
characteristics of a state of legality. 7 A country is hardly describable
as a liberal democracy if it fails the test of being a constitutional state
or state of legality. For this reason, Rechtsstaat is also describable as
rule of law, limited government, substantive due process,
reasonableness, equal protection, and full and fair hearing, which is
equally true of Anglo-American rule of law and French btat de
droit.'
In a globalizing multicultural world, there have been problems
in defining the rule of law, mostly attributable to problems of
constitutionalism and democratic transition. In a post-Cold War era
(i.e., after 1991), conceptual stretching is an increasing
phenomenon. 9 In non-Western and developing countries, there is a
proclivity to employ Western notions of democracy and
constitutionalism to describe a diverse range of social and political
phenomena, including different theoretical approaches and models.2"
The multifarious nature of rule of law has been lent to different
meanings in different contexts and in different legal systems because

15. See ROBERT VON MOHL, DIE DEUTSCHE POLIZEIWISSENSCHAFT NACH DEN
GRUNDSATZEN DES RECHTSSTAATES [GERMAN POLICE SCIENCE AFTER THE PRINCIPLES OF THE
RIGHT STATE] (1866).
16. See M. Ulric Killion, Post-WTO China and Independent Judicial Review, 26 HOUS. J.
INT'L L. 507, 532 n. 131 (2004).
17. LUC HEUSCHLING, ETAT DE DROIT, RECHSTAAT, RULE OF LAW, (Dalloz 2002); Ulrich
Karpen, Conditions of 'Rechstaat' Efficiency Particularly in Developing and Newly
IndustrialisingCountries, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 13, at 263; Rosenfeld, supra note 14,
at 1308-09.
18. See HEUSCHLING, supra note 17.
19. Giovanni Sartori, Concept Misformation in ComparativePolitics, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1033, 1041 (1970).
20. Id.
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there is neither consensus on what the rule of law means nor what it
stands against."1
Enhancing the difficulty of defining the rule of law is that it has
both a descriptive and prescriptive content, as true of concepts such
as liberty and equality. These descriptive meanings are contingent
on prescriptive meanings or norms of a culture and society.22
The rule of law has come to mean different things for different
legal traditions.23 For example, the American appellate review
structure, and its activism and powers of constitutional review,
characterize a judicial pyramid structure in the placements of power,
adjudication, and review.24 American courts generally focus on the
legal rights of parties because, as observed by Chief Justice Marshall
in Marbury v. Madison, a primary task of the American courts has
always been "to say what the law is."25

A distinguishing feature of American courts is the authority to
rule on the constitutionality of a law while also fashioning
appropriate legal relief for parties.26 It is a judicial model that
designedly promotes legal accountability rather than political
accountability.27 There are also other Western models, such as the
revision model of Germany's Federal Constitutional Court, the
cassation models of France's Court of Cassation, and Italy's
28
Constitutional Court.

The efficiencies of the rule of law-civil law versus rule of
law-common law systems, admittedly, have been the subject of
debate. During the late 1990s, a group of economists conducting
cross-country research concerning legal rules and economic growth
concluded that "countries whose legal systems originated in the
English common law have enjoyed superior per capita income
21.

Rosenfeld, supra note 14, at 1308.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1309.
24. Fu Yulin, Comparative Research on Judicial Hierarchy, ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE
[SOC. SCI. CHINA], Spring 2003, at 39, 41; see also CIVIL APPEAL PROCEDURES WORLDWIDE
327 (Charles Platto ed. 1992).
25. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
26. William J. Nardini, Passive Activism and the Limits of JudicialSelf-Restraint: Lessons
for America from the Italian ConstitutionalCourt, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 38 n. 119 (2000).
27. Lord Irvine of Lairg, Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in
Britain andAmerica, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2001).
28. Fu Yulin, supra note 24, at 39-40; Nardini, supra note 26, at 5, 16-18.

Winter 2008]

CHINA 'S CONSTITUTION

growth compared with so-called civil law countries, whose law is
based on European codes, especially those countries whose law is
based on the Napoleonic codes and hence on French law. ' 29 Many
would disagree and, instead, hail the superiority of civil law systems,
because the civil-common law dichotomy has been the subject of
debate for a substantial period."
For instance, on the European continent, Germanists, or
Germanist jurists and legal historians such as Otto Friedrich von
Gierke (1841-1921), searched for guidance from sources of Roman
law.3 Sources ranged from the juristic science of the Roman
pontifices in prehistoric times, the Law of the Twelve Tables
(published 451-450 B.C.), the Code of Justinian (Corpus Juris
Civilis, compiled A.D. 529-565), to later students of Roman law and
written commentaries on praetor's edicts of Roman jurisconsults.32
They did so for purposes of interpreting the development and
meaning of German law, as did studies of the antecedents to German
law influence Herr von Gierke's views on Rechtsstaat and the federal
nature of medieval states, which led him to become an early
opponent of civil law systems. 3
However, for countries sharing common universal values, in the
sense of the Platonic idea or Aristotelian form and its progeny of
Western legal tradition or common Western legal civilization, there
is the commonality of the Enlightenment and its subsequent
interpretations, especially the high ideal of a liberal democracy. In
addition, the different Western models of constitutional or judicial
review, such as the appeal, revision, and cassation models,
eventually converge to a three-tier pyramid structure despite their
diverging and distinctive histories and procedural structures.3 4 It now
seems a tacit assumption that though there may be inherent problems
29. KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS 5 (2006).
30. See, e.g., Robert Adriaansen, At the Edges of the Law: Civil Law v. Common Law: A
Response to Professor Richard B. Cappalli, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 107 (evaluating the
various benefits and limitations of the common and civil legal systems).
31. See, e.g., SOBEI MOGI, OTTO VON GEIRKE: His POLITICAL TEACHINGS AND
JURISPRUDENCE (1932); BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW (1992); FRITZ
SCHULZ, HISTORY OF ROMAN LEGAL SCIENCE (1967).
32. See MOGI, supra note 31; NICHOLS, supra note 31; SCHULZ, supra note 31.
33. RUDOLF HUBNER, A HISTORY OF GERMANIC PRIVATE LAW 156-58 (2000) (discussing
Gierke's elaboration of "associational theory" as clearing the way for an understanding of
German law).
34. Yulin Fu, supra note 24, at 39, 43-44 (discussing the judicial pyramid).
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in both rule of law systems, rule of law systems are superior to nonrule of law systems because they promote democracy, greater
predictability, and stability.
Perhaps as a matter of public choice theory, though primarily
concerned with the economic analysis of political choice, rather than
market choice, individuals generally choose to have government,
rather than not have government and return to the state of nature.
Individuals manifest this choice by surrendering a portion of their
individual liberties as a necessary part of the social contract with
others similarly situated.35 Individuals that consent to government
under a constitutional state, rule of law state, or state of legality are
better off because it is the social contract and not anarchic society
serving the greater interest of civil individuals.36
B. The WTO Rules and Standards
Notwithstanding democracy, predictability, and stability,
modern states of legality also promote a more liberal international
economic order based on a market system, sound money, and the
rule of law.37 Due to economic reforms and a goal of participating in
the new global market or liberal market economy, membership status
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and WTO
has influenced, and continues to influence, legal reforms. Such
influence is recognizable from the Republic of China's ("ROC")
1947 GATT membership and subsequent resignation, to China's
1986 application for renewal of or resuming GATT membership, to
China's 2001 accession to the WTO.38 The United States and other
WTO members scrutinized China's application to the WTO because
35. See, e.g., KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 1-2 (1963);

JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 291-99 (2000); lAIN MCLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE:
AN INTRODUCTION (1987); China'sFinancialSystem and Monetary Policies: The Impact on U.S.
Exchange Rates, Capital Markets, and Interest Rates: Hearing on U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of James A. Dom, Vice President
for Academic Affairs, CATO Institute).
36. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1962) (1651); JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge U. Press 1988) (1689);
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS
(Victor Goureveitch ed., 1997) (1762).
37. Gerard Alexander, Institutionalized Uncertainty, The Rule of Law, and The Sources of
DemocraticStability, 10 COMP. POL. STUD. 1145 (2002).
38. See WANG YI, GATT & WTO-LAW AND RULES FOR WORLD TRADE 168-74 (1998);
Penelope B. Prime, China Joins the WTO: How, Why,and What Now? The Overall, Long-Term,
Effects Should Be Positive, but Don't Expect Too Much, Too Soon, BUS. ECON., Apr. 2002, at 26.
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an earlier WTO report confirmed that members must establish sound
legal mechanisms for implementing their obligations under the WTO
Agreement. For China, accession represented a prescription for
broad systemic reforms in the areas of transparency, fairness, and
independent judicial review.39
A commitment to legal reforms, generally, derives from China's
acceptance of key provisions in the Protocol on Accession and other
WTO rules.4" Article 2(A)2 of the Protocol on Accession reads,
"China shall apply and administer in a uniform, impartial and
reasonable manner all its laws, regulations and other measures...
pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights ("TRIPS") or the control of
foreign exchange."41 The Protocol on Accession, at Article 2(D),
further specifies judicial review in the administration of the trade
regime.42
Judicial review is also a requirement of Article X of GATT, on
the publication and administration of trade regulations, and reads,
"Each contracting party shall maintain, or institute as soon as
practicable, judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures
for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of
administrative action relating to customs matters."43 Similarly, the
amended Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, at Article 13, on Judicial
Review, requires:
Each Member whose national legislation contains
provisions on anti-dumping measures shall maintain
judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures
for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review of
administrative actions relating to final determinations and
reviews of determinations within the meaning of Article 11.
Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent of the

39. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protectionfor Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, % 57-58, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997).
40. Protocolson Accession, supra note 6, paras. 2(A)(2), 2(D).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. GATT, supra note 11, art. X.
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authorities responsible for the determination or review in
question."
The inherent vagueness and generalities of the WTO rules and
standards is problematic because they limit their potential in
promoting a more Western model of constitutionalism or state of
legality, including rule of law and judicial review. The review
requirement could be met through judicial, arbitral, or administrative
review since the WTO rules only require judicial review, which is a
review mechanism independent of the authorities responsible for the
determination or review in question.45
Notwithstanding an amendment of the WTO rules and explicit
language requiring independent judicial review, the rules allow for
traditional rather than independent judicial review,46 which could
encompass a problematic Marxist legal theory or socialist
jurisprudence. China's attempt to finalize the localization of
Marxism enhances the potential for, and maybe even threatens
aspects of, a future model of constitutionalism and judicial
independence that is contingent on Marxist legal theory or socialist
jurisprudence. China's first Trade Policy Review Report reads,
"China has reviewed legislation and revised and issued a
considerable number of new laws in connection with its Membership
of the WTO," which are legal reforms primarily focusing on new
regulations and rules for changing economic needs and international
commitments. In the interim, as a result of inherently vague WTO
rules, China can commit "some" resources for "some" legal reforms,
by enacting "some" new legal propositions or laws, and meet its
baseline Protocol on Accession requirements.
One-party CCP rule and prioritized economic growth results in
legal reforms focused on compliance, though minimally, with the
WTO rules and standards, which are reforms focused on improving
China's socialist market economic legal system, implementing the
WTO rules, and enacting laws that, generally, tally with the WTO

44. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, supra note 11, pt. 1, art. 13.
45. Id.
46. M. Ulric Killion, Questfor Legal Safeguardsfor Foreign Exporters Under China'sAntiDumping Regime, 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 417, 425 (2004).
47. Trade Policy Review Report, supra note 9, at 29.
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rules.48 Problematic are ongoing legal reforms that primarily focus
on preparing the nation for participation in the new global market or
liberal market economy by "continuing to revise laws that are not in
conformity with China's obligations under the WTO rules; revising
laws that are not conducive to enhancing the competitive power of
Chinese enterprises in the international market; and improving laws
offering protection to domestic enterprises and ensuring industrial
safety."49 Conversely, to protect both economic liberty and noneconomic liberty interests from the arbitrary exercise of government
power, modern states of legality pursue a more liberal international
economic order based on a market system, sound money, and the
rule of law."
C. Evolution of PositiveLaw in Antiquity
Notwithstanding the influence of the WTO rules, traditional
culture and society also continue to influence modern legal reforms.
In the native Chinese language and appropriate legal lexicon, the
concept of constitutionalism from the late-Qing dynasty literally
means "building up the constitution."'" For modem China, and its
native language, culture, ideology, thought system, and appropriate
lexicons, a Western conceptualization
and lexicon of
constitutionalism will not share the same value-laden meanings or
influence.
The value-laden liberal ideals of constitutionalism, democracy,
and liberty espoused by Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke
and Jean-Jacque Rousseau, "that government was held in trust
instead of by ordained right and that the monarch was a mere agent
48. See Jerome Alan Cohen, Tiananmen and the Rule of Law, in THE BROKEN MIRROR:
CHINA AFTER TIANANMEN 323, 323-28 (George Hicks ed., 1990); see also CHI FULIN, CHINA:
THE NEW STAGE OF REFORM (2004); Song Linfei, China's Accession to the WTO and the
Building of a Socialist Market Economic Legal System, in CHINA: ACCESSION TO THE WTO AND
ECONOMIC REFORM 331-64 (Wang Mengkui ed., 2002); Jiang Wei, China's WTO Achievements
Recognized, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 15, 2005, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/15/
eng20051215_228220.html.
49. Wang Baoshu, supra note 7, at 338.
50. See Alexander, supra note 37.
51. R. Randle Edwards et al., Symposium on China and Constitutionalism: Introduction, 9 J.
CHINESE L. 1, 2 (1995) (noting that Constitutionalism has also been defined as the ideology of the
constitution); Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China's Judicial Reform, 4
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 255, 261-62 n.13 (2003) (citing Mo Jihong, Jianli Xianfa Quanwei,
Baozhang Gongmin Quanli [Establishing the Authority of the Constitution to Protect Citizens'
Rights], BEIJING RIBAO [BEIJING DAILY], Dec. 2, 2002, at 14).

574

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 41:563

of society with 'no will, no power but that of law, ' '52 are conceptions

that seem alien to the traditional Chinese social structure of
hierarchical relationships and patriarchal values, as well as its
vestiture of authority not in the people, but rather in the state. 3 In
terms of the culture relative or problems in value pluralism, the
Confucian value system prioritized society first by placing in the
primary, in the continuum of values, a greater concern in benefiting
the state and the kingdom, loyalty to the sovereign, and devolution to
country. 4 The traditional Confucian ethic or virtue manifesting filial
piety influences a resulting Confucian model for an ideal governing
polity, because the virtue of filial piety informs the virtue of loyalty
to the monarch. Thus, the concept of the state as an enlarged family
results in the monarch-subject relationship becoming a social
extension of the Confucian father-son relationship.5
This does not mean that China in antiquity did not have legal
systems or institutions, because there was a legal system with a builtin mechanism for organic change. 6 A development and evolution of
law occurs when man-made laws replace old customs and rites or
natural law (or natural moral law), because a need for new
institutions necessitates replacing the authority of the Son of Heaven
with the authority of the ruler of the state. 7 Law as a system or
institution would appear and evolve as a built-in mechanism for
organic change, while no longer being solely confined to enforcing
prescriptions of traditional culture or natural moral law or to lending
itself to enforcing the standards of man-made laws or the state."
A positive law evolved but left in its evolutionary track a clash
between traditional culture and positive law, which served as a

52. Lawrence R. Sullivan, Intellectualand Political Controversies over Authority in China:
1898-1922, in CONFUCIAN CULTURES OF AUTHORITY 171, 184 (Peter D. Hershock & Roger T.
Ames eds., 2006).
53. See M. Ulric Killion, China's Amended Constitution: Questfor Liberty and Independent
JudicialReview, 4 WASH U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 43 (2005).
54. See Feng Lan, The Female Individualand the Empire: A HistoricistApproach to Mulan
andKingston's Woman Warrior, 55 COMP. LITERATURE 229 (2003).
55. Id.
56. Harold J. Berman, The Origins of HistoricalJurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103
YALE L.J. 1651, 1654 (1994) (noting that a system of law should have a built-in mechanism for
organic change to be uniquely Western, at least in the twelfth century).
57. See, e.g., J.J.L. DUYVENDAK, THE BOOK OF LORD SHANG 47-48 (1928).
58. Berman, supra note 56, at 1652-55.
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political expedient for imperialism and centralizing government.59
The evolution in antiquity, by development and growth, is traditional
Confucianism and its infusion of law with morals, and legalism as a
harbor for positive law, vying for dominance." While what earlier
evolved in antiquity constituted new legal institutions, especially the
written laws, the new legal institutions problematically focused on
safeguarding the powers of government rather than individual rights
and privileges, because the observance of written laws was
imperative and the sought after deterrent effect necessitates laws that
were severe. However, the severity of positive law in antiquity does
not deny the potential of law in antiquity as a legal system or
institution or philosophical form. Such law could constitute an
organic system that could experience a further historical growth and
evolutionary development.
An earlier development and evolution of positive law also did
not displace the influence of traditional culture, a process
commenced by the communists in the 1920s, because the historical
development of law directly links to traditional Confucian morality.6
This historical development of law is divisible into three periods.
First, in antiquity or the pre-Han period, law and morality were
separable concepts that served different purposes and philosophical
traditions.62 During this period, Confucian morality, which the
earlier sages developed into norms, was a separate philosophical
precept and represented the rules of conduct governing relationships
between men.6 3 Second, during the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D.
220), there was a further development of law in the spirit of morality,
because during the Confucianization of law or legalization of
Confucianism, traditional Confucian morals mold an early legal
system, which then acquires an ethical context.' Third, after the
Chinese Revolution (1911), during the reign of the Republic of
China (1911-1949), law is westernized, but morality remained

59. DUYVENDAK, supra note 57, at 47-48.
60. David A. Funk, Traditional Chinese Jurisprudence:Justifying Li and Fa, 17 S.U. L.
REV. 1, 44-45 (1990).
61. See Chung-ying Cheng, Commentary on Herbert H.P. Ma's "Law and Morality: Some
Reflections on the Chinese Experience Past and Present," 21 PHIL. E. & W. 461 (1971).
62. Id.
63. See FUNG YU-LAN, SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF FLNG YU-LAN (1998).
64. See Chung-ying Cheng, supra note 61.
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traditional. This meant that Confucian morality still influenced
society by ordering society and producing good government and by
addressing the education, cultivation, and fulfillment of an individual
instead of an exclusivity for government and social control.65
In terms of government and social control, Han Fei Zi (a school
of legalists or realists) further developed this view of government by
Confucian morality, but with a different goal in mind.66 Han Fei Zi,
and other legalists before the third century B.C., denied the influence
of traditional Confucian morality. 67
Rather, they used law
exclusively for the Machiavellian purpose of political and social
rectification, which means rectifying laws clearly and establishing
severe penalties.68
The first two periods represent the classic struggle for
dominance between traditional Confucianism and legalism, or the
struggle between rule by man and rule by law.69 In antiquity, there
was a legal system with a built-in mechanism for organic change,
which, like Western culture and its philosophical forms, experiences
a historical growth and evolutionary development.7"
Modem
Chinese communists find it problematic that traditional Confucian
morality continues to exert its influence.71
As for modem China's state of legality, the citizenry are still
awaiting the 1978 promise of legal reforms and democracy. In 1946,
Mao Zedong offered democracy as the means to stop the historic
cycle of dynastic change. 72

Between 1940 and 1949, the CCP

demanded democracy because a grassroots democracy helped the
communists struggle through military campaigns and to politically
pursue legitimacy. Thus, the Communists extolled democracy; "the
73
fuller and the quicker the democracy, the better it was for them.
65. Id.
66. Funk, supra note 60, at 44-45.
67.
68.
(1515).
69.
70.
71.
Theory

Id.
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Luigi Ricci trans., New Am. Library 1952)
Funk, supra note 60, at 44-45.
Berman, supra note 56, at 1652-55.
George Xuezhi Guo, The Guanxi (Interpersonal Relations) of Chinese Communist Elite:
and Practice (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Va.) (on file with author).

72. Li YongYan, supra note 5; see also Edward Cody, China's Premier Calls Democracy a
Distant Goal, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2007, at A13; PremierSays Promoting Fairnessand Social
Justice Is a Major Task, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Feb. 27, 2007.
73. Li YongYan, supra note 5.
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However, modem China remains steadfast to the misnomer of
socialist democracy: neither Mao, nor Deng Xiaoping, or subsequent
leaders have tried real democracy such as a democratically elected
legislature or National People's Congress ("NPC").74 From Mao to
Hu Jintao, the concept of democracy remains subject to the influence
of Marxism because it is a proletarian democracy that is "guaranteed
by the people's democratic dictatorship" rather than Western-style
democracy.75 Chinese constitutionalism is still developing, but the
influence of Marxism impedes its growth toward a more Western
model of constitutionalism, as opposed to a variant thereof, such as
an economic-specific, culture-specific,76 or even Marxist model.
D. Modern China'sState of Legality
In 1997, the CCP, through its NPC, announced that China would
elect rule of law in governing its society.7 7 In 1999, the NPC added,
by amendment, the concept of rule of law to the 1982 Constitution.7"
As of 2007, the 1982 Constitution has undergone four constitutional
amendments--on April 12, 1988, March 29, 1993, March 15, 1999,
and March 14, 2004. 79 The third constitutional amendment declares
China will practice rule of law, and an amendment to Article 5,
reads, "The People's Republic of China practices ruling the country
8°
in accordance with the law and building a socialist country of law.
However, the 1982 Constitution prescribes a legislative hierarchy
that challenges constitutionalism and rule of law.

74. ANDREW JAMES NATHAN, CHINESE DEMOCRACY 101 (1985).
75. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME (Foreign
Language

Press

1972) (1890);

STATE COUNCIL INFO.

OFFICE, BUILDING OF POLITICAL

DEMOCRACY IN CHINA (2005), available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Oct/
145718.htm.
76. Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the "Rise of the
World Constitutionalism," 2000 WIS. L. REV. 597, 604-13; Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitution
Making in the Countries of Former Soviet Dominance: Current Development, 23 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 155, 158 (1993); see also Richard A. Rosen, ConstitutionalProcess, Constitutionalism,
and the EritreanExperience, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 263, 273 (1999).
77. Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China's Judicial Reform, 4 ASIANPAC. L. & POL'Y J. 255, 261 (2003).
78. Hal Blanchard, ConstitutionalRevisionism in the PRC: "Seeking Truth From Facts, " 17
FLA. J. INT'L L. 365, 375 (2005).
79. Katie Lee, China and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Prospects and Challenges, 6 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 445, 445 (2007).
80. XIAN FA (1982); XIAN FA XIU ZHENG art. 13 (1999).
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Notwithstanding the de facto power of the CCP, pursuant to the
1982 Constitution, the NPC is the national legislature and highest or
supreme organ of state power. Its standing body is the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress ("NPCSC").81 The
NPC exercises typical legislative functions, such as enacting and
amending basic laws, electing Procurator-General, planning for
national economy and social development, declaring war, and
amending the constitution.82 However, the powers of the NPC are
distinguishable in two respects: (1) the NPC has the power to enforce
the constitution; and (2) through the NPCSC it has the power of
judicial review.83 The NPC meets once a year, which results in its
State Councilors and Ministers, who are in charge of ministries or
commissions such as China's Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM"),
having more powers than expressly delegated in the 1982
Constitution. 4 The annual session of the NPC is brief and addresses
numerous items of business, including examination of the
government's work and budgetary review.85 As for the NPCSC, it
meets bi-monthly and primarily focuses on law making issues.86
Neither the NPC nor NPCSC has substantive time to conduct
constitutional overviews and investigations of constitutional
violations.87
As for judicial review powers, Amended Article 5 of the 1982
Constitution reads, "the People's Republic of China governs the
country according to law and makes it a socialist country ruled by
law,"88 and Article 127 provides that the Supreme People's Court is
the highest judicial organ.89 However, constitutionalism in action
and text reduced a potential for a rule of law rubric to a non-rule of
law rubric, reduced a potential for legal accountability to political
accountability. This left China's judicial system without a positive
81. XIANFAch. III, § 1(1982).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. People's Republic of China Ministry of Commerce, MOFCOM, http://
english.mofcom.gov.cn/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
85. China Set Up New Agency to See to Constitution Application, XINHUA [CHINA VIEW],
June 21, 2004.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
XIAN FA XIU ZHENG AN art. 13 (1999).
XIAN FA art. 127, § 7 (1982).
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discursive machinery for judicial review: neither constitutional
review or constitutional court, nor decentralized (or diffused) or
centralized (or concentrated) constitutional review. The NPCSC has
legislative interpretation power, or the sole power to interpret the
constitution, laws of China, and China's legislative procedure law.
The 2000 Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China
confirms this power by defining the roles of lawmakers and
procedures and by establishing a legal hierarchy between the
constitution, laws, administrative regulations and orders, at both
national and local levels.9 °
In terms of the trade regime, the Legislation Law also stipulates
that individuals, enterprises, or organizations may submit written
suggestions to the NPCSC, if they deem regulations or rules as
contradicting the 1982 constitution or laws.9' The NPCSC conducts
studies of these suggestions.92 While the Supreme People's Court
has judicial interpretation power, it is only the power to interpret
laws and regulations of China arising from actual cases. This is not
the same power constitutionally vested with the NPCSC to interpret
the 1982 constitution and laws of China. 93 The NPCSC responds to
this critique of lack of a positive discursive machinery for judicial
review by creating a new agency that offers more promises than
deeds.
The NPCSC establishes this new agency as a division under the
Legal Affairs Commission of the NPCSC for the purpose of
reviewing whether legislation or government decisions tally with the
1982 Constitution. 94 Though earlier announced in 2004 that the staff
would roughly number fifty, as of 2006, this new agency was

90. XIAN FA arts. 67(1), 67(4), ch.3 § 1 (1982); Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Lifa Fa
[Legislation Law of the P.R.C.], (3d Sess. Ninth Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 2000,
promulgated by Order No. 31, President of the People's Republic of China (Mar. 15, 2000).
91. Legislation Law of the P.R.C., art. 90.

92. Id.
93. Id. arts. 67(1), 67(4), ch.3 § 1 (1982); Letter of Reply from Supreme People's Court of
P.R.C. Concerning the Inappropriateness of Citing Constitution as a Basis for Convictions and
Sentencing in Criminal Judgments (1955); Reply from Supreme People's Court of P.R.C.
Concerning How People's Courts Are to Cite Legally Normative Documents When Producing
Legal Documents (1986).
94. See China Set Up New Agency to See to Constitution Application, supra note 85; Meng
Yan, New Agency to See to Constitution Application, CHINA DAILY, June 21, 2004, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/2 Icontent_340970.htm.
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comprised of a small staff of about ten to fifteen people.95 It presents
a blueprint for a constitutional crisis rather than promoting the
growth and development of a state of legality.
The process for amending the 1982 Constitution is also
problematic because, while constitutions sometimes need revision
and amendment, the 1982 Constitution granted the NPC the authority
to amend the Constitution by a flexible, rather than rigid, process.
Donald P. Kommers writes, "[A] viable constitution-that is, one
that guarantees and respects the ideal of constitutionalism-will
make sure that it does not promise more than it can deliver; that it
confines itself mainly to the protection of negative liberties; and that
it organizes the branches of government in a way that limits state
power without interfering with the effective exercise of popular
government."97 In terms of the practice of constitutionalizing party
ideologies, Anne F. Thurston demonstrates the gist of this problem
by a simple, yet poignant question: "Are the names of your leaders
mentioned in your constitution?"98 On March 14, 2004, the NPC
amended the 1982 Constitution by incorporating Jiang Zemin's
theory of the "Three Represents" into the preamble as one of the
guiding principles of the nation, together with the heritage and
further development of Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought,
and Deng Xiaoping Theory.99 There is a dangerous precedent of
constitutionalizing party ideologies by a flexible as opposed to rigid
amendment process.
95. See China Set Up New Agency to See to ConstitutionApplication, supra note 85; China's
PopulationHits 1.3 Billion, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2005.
96. See generally XIAN FA arts. 62(1), 67(1)-(2), ch. 3, § 1 (1982); XIAN FA XIU ZHENG AN
arts. 1-2 (1988); XAN FA XIU ZHENG AN arts. 3-11 (1993); XIAN FA XIU ZHENG AN arts. 12-17
(1999); Dag Anckar & Lauri Karvonen, Constitutional Amendment Methods in the Democracies
of the World (Aug. 15-17, 2002) (paper presented at the 13th Nordic Political Science Congress,
Aalborg, Denmark).
97. Donald P. Kommers, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism, 9 E.
EUR. CONST. REV. 92, 94 (2000) (reviewing ANDRAS SAJO, LIMITED GOVERNMENT (1999)); see
also Hua Hua, Balance Between Consistency, Adaptability, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 30, 2003,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-10/30/content_276802.htm;
Human
Rights, Private Property Fixed as Pillars, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 23, 2003, available at http:/l
www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003- 12123/content_292557.htm.
98. Anne F. Thurston, Memory and Mourning: China Ten Years after Tiananmen, SAIS
REV., Summer-Fall 1999, at 61, 61-62 (1999).
99. Full Text of Resolution on Amendment to CPC Constitution, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 15,
2002; Human Rights, Private Property Fixed as Pillars, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 23, 2003; Jiang
Faces Reform Attacks From Within, CNN.coM, Aug. 28, 2002, http://edition.cnn.com/
2002/world/asiapcf/east/08/28/china.zhao/index.html.
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As a measure of constitutionalism, the rule of law became a tool
of government, actual rule by law, or a policy-driven model because
of its usage in crackdowns against those labeled as political
dissidents. Such dissidents include the prosecutions and persecutions
post-Tiananmen Square (1989), the crackdowns against the
Falungong, the crackdowns against other pro-democracy, cyberdemocracy, and teledemocracy forces, as well as to other
injustices.0° Modem China's state of legality should evolve to a
system that holds government accountable for its actions as well as
incorporates respect for international human rights. This presents
issues of how to promote a more Western constitutional design in
China, and whether China will eventually embrace a more Western
model of constitutionalism. This also presents issues of whether
China's polity will pursue Western or Marxist models of
modernization.
Walter W. Rostow's classical modernization theory and its
reliance on evolutionary theory and functionalist theory emphasizes
social engineering, such as poorer societies emulating models of
developed countries.' China, as a developing non-market economy,
is at the first of five stages of Rostow's stages theory of economic
growth: a generally traditional society, limited output, limited access
to science and technology, and decentralized political power.0 2
Some may contend China is at the second stage, which is generally
characterized by new ideas favoring economic growth, higher levels
of education, increased levels of entrepreneurship, more institutions
capable of mobilizing capital, increases in investment, and a duality
because of the persistence of traditional society.0 3 Only during the
fifth stage is there mass consumption, with economic sectors
specializing in durable consumer goods and services, and economic
100. See generally J.A.G. ROBERTS, A CONCISE HISTORY OF CHINA 293-99 (1999); M. Ulric
Killion, China Internet Tax: Issues of Particularism, Liberalization, and Integration, II MICH.
ST. U.-DETROIT C.L. J. INT'L L. 369 (2002); Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 43 (2001).
101. See generally AUGUSTE COMTE, POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE, PART I
(Harriet Martineau trans., Kessinger pub. 2003) (1985) (for classical functionalist theory);
CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES, BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION (Gramercy
1995) (1859) (for classical evolutionary theory); TALCOTT PARSONS, STRUCTURE AND PROCESS
IN MODERN SOCIETIES (Free Press 1963) (1960); WALTER W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (1960).
102. See generally ROSTOW, supra note 101.
103. Id.
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growth in the pursuit of profit maximization rather than central
planning, which would influence social and government policy.'"
Rostow's theory suggests that modernization necessitates casting
China as starting from a traditional stage and needing to transition to

a modern stage, or transcendence of the traditional system by the
modem one, which will evolve into a more Western constitutional
design. However, the influence of Marxism confines the historical

growth and evolutionary development of legal institutions, which
presents issues of how Marxism ultimately influences
constitutionalism or "building up the constitution."

III.

MARXISM AND "BUILDING UP THE CONSTITUTION"

In post-WTO China, the laws, regulations, and cases serve as a
measure of both modem legal reforms and "building up the
constitution."''

5

A problem is that they also present plausible

different perspectives regarding the success or failure of ongoing
legal reforms. In a post-WTO China, individual civil litigants
pursuing legal rights in a court of law demonstrate a degree of
success, reflecting the enactments of new legal propositions or laws
by the NPC' °6 and administrative bodies." 7 Mei Ying Gechlik's 2005
study of Shanghai's legal reforms demonstrates these improvements
and suggests that Shanghai could possibly serve as the archetypal

path to legal reforms.0 8
104. Id.
105. Inclusion of Human Rights in Constitution Marks a Milestone, Beijing, March 14, 2004
(Xinhuanet); http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-03/14/content_1365532.htm. "Ever since
the end of the Qing Dynasty a century ago, the Chinese people have been struggling to build up a
truly democratic constitutional government."
106. See, e.g., 2005 Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 28, 2005); China to Enact First Anti-Sexual
Harassment Law, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 4, 2005, available at http://www.chinadaily.com/cn/
english/doc/2005-03/04/content_421875.htm; China Outlaws Sexual Harassment, XINHUA

[CHINA VIEW], Aug. 29, 2005, available at http://english.peopledaily.com/en/200508/29/
eng20050829_204985.html.
107. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo fanqingxiao tiaoli [Anti-Dumping Regulation of the
People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the State Council, Nov. 26, 2001, effective Jan. 1
2001) (P.R.C.), available at http://bizchina.chinadaily.com.cn/guide/lnw/law36.htm; Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan gonggao (Zui Gao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Chengli
Fanqingxiao Xingzheng Anjian Yingyong Falv Ruogan Wenti De Guiding) [Provisions of the
Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Anti-Dumping
Administrative Cases] (Supreme People's Ct., Nov. 2, 2002).
108. Mei Ying Gechlik, Judicial Reform in China: Lessons from Shanghai, 19 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 97 (2005).
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There is another perspective, however, demonstrating a degree
of failure in legal reforms because modem legal reforms follow a
pattern similar to economic reforms, which involves policy
Policy
experimentation rationalized by CCP policy.'"
experimentation also appears to be influencing the issue of legal
China's legal
institutional convergence versus divergence.
experimentation and willingness to commit "some" resources for
"some" legal reforms, such as "some" new legal propositions or
laws, like its economic experimentation, inevitably produces noncapitalist institutional innovations that are supposedly, optimally
suited to China's particular economic circumstances (i.e., the
localization of Marxism to the realities of traditional culture and
society).' °
There are other flaws with modem China's state of legality, such
as the problems attributable to issues of the constitution in action and
constitution in text, and extra-constitutionalism in practice.1"' The
problems are substantive and many, ranging from the historical
incorporation of party ideologies to the CCP's views on
constitutional theory and practice, such as China electing to follow
democratic centralism and socialist democracy rather than
Montesquieu's separation of the powers of government principle." 2
Western experts and authority rightly search for a constitutional state
or state of legality, resembling models of Western states of legality.

109. Wing Thye Woo, A United Frontfor the Common Objective to Understand China's
Economic Growth: A Case of Nonantagonistic Contradiction, Wu vs. Woo, ISSUES & STUDIES
June 2003, at 1, 16 (noting that specifically, China's future growth performance depends on
whether past successes were: "(1) the result of China's economic experimentation that produced
non-capitalist institutional innovations that were optimally suited to the country's particular
economic circumstances, or (2) the result of China's institutional convergence and integration
with the advanced WTO economies like France, Japan, and the United States").
110. Trade Policy Review Report, supra note 9, at 29 (Since the mid-1980s, the NPC has
delegated responsibility for issuing regulations to the State Council, which has resulted in
"interim provisions" that also carry the force of law; these interim provisions are replaced by laws
after they are tested and when the authorities deem them appropriate. Policies are also
occasionally implemented on a "trial" basis.).
11l. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, VOL. 1 (First Harvard Univ.
Press 1993) (1991) (discussing extra-constitutionalism). See generally Stephen D. Krasner,
Approaches to the State, Alternative Conceptions and HistoricalDynamics, 16 COMP. POL. 223
(1984) (examining-via a review of recent literature-how state authority, through institutional
structures, changes in response to alterations in domestic and international environments).
112. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (1748),
reprintedin GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952).
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The flaws in Chinese constitutionalism, including rule of law,
are primarily problems of constitutional practices, which presents
issues of a constitution in text/constitution in action dichotomy.
Illustrating this dichotomy, the U.S. Country Reports on China
routinely find, "[T]he Constitution and laws provide for fundamental
human rights; however, these protections are often ignored in
practice."' 13 The constitution in action demonstrates a problem of
constitutional stipulations and prescriptions for equality, or the
constitution in text, and their respective applications or enforceability
under the rule of law, in a court of law.
The resulting disparity between the constitution in text and
constitution in action also, arguably, produced a persistent state of
extra-constitutionalism in practice, which presents a real problem,
especially concerning the plight of Chinese citizens. In China, many
now contend that there is an increasing phenomenon of challenges to
government power." 4 Cases and issues supposedly challenging
government power include: investigations by People's Congresses;. 5
hearings into prices; administrative examination and approval;
expulsion of discipline-violating college students; judicialization of
constitutional law; detention and sending back home of indigent
migrants; pre-marriage physical check-ups; impeachment of judges;
discrimination against hepatitis B patients; emergency measures in
the face of SARS and bird flu; land acquisition; urban demolition
and resettlement; illegally prolonged detention; labor security;
judgments on the Liu Yong case and the BMW case; and combating
corruption and building a clean government." 6
However, a
successful challenge to government power is rare, as seen in the
famous Seeds case, and in subsequent treatment by party officials of
Judge Li Huijuan."'
113. S. REP. NO. 107-32, at 738 (2001), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
archives/107/71555d.pdf; see also S. REP. No. 108-30, at 845 (2003), available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/107/78290c.pdf (discussing specific examples of
such violations).
114. Shen Kui, Normative Basis for the Changes of China's Public Law, ZHONGGUO SHEHUI
KEXUE [SOC. SCI. CHINA], Winter 2004, at 28-29.
115. See XIAN FA arts. 57-58, 61-62, 62(2), 67(1), 67(4), ch. 1 (1982) (containing the
constitutional provisions regarding the National People's Congress).
116. Shen Kui, supra note 114.
117. Jim Yardley, A Judge Tests China's Courts, Making History, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
2005. In the "Seeds Case," Judge Li Hujian addressed a conflict between a national law on seeds
and a provincial regulation (local law) on seeds issued by the Henan People's Congress;
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A persistent state of extra-constitutionalism in practice also
produces distinctive juridical practices, such as a distinctive
procedural structure for review of cases. As earlier mentioned, while
Anglo-American rule of law, German Rechtsstaat and French Etat de
droit are distinctive, they still converge around a commonality of the
Enlightenment and its subsequent interpretations, especially the high
ideal of a liberal democracy. This commonality also results in a
convergence of juridical practices, including procedural structures
for review of cases,"' which reflects a convergence of the
constitution in action and the constitution in text of these
representative country-samplings of Western jurisprudence. There is
also the convergence of common law and civil law systems toward
the idea of precedents and stare decisis, as recent studies demonstrate
that judicial decisions play an important role in both civil law and
common law systems." 9 While earlier Western models of procedural
structures for review diverge because of distinctive histories and
procedural structures, they, despite their differences, eventually
converge to a three-tier pyramid structure. 2 °
China's law case review model or procedural structure for
review starkly contrasts Western models because it is a pole-shaped
two-tier structure rather than pyramid-shaped three-tier structure.'2 '
The establishment of a two-tier structure is arguably attributable to
the 1949 founding of modern China, the political economy of the
1950s, official CCP ideology and policy about the role of law and
legal issues in modern culture and society. Although, before 1949,
there was a three-tier structure in place that included a one-tier

following her ruling, the Luoyang Middle Court's discipline committee contacted her because
Henan Province officials complained that the ruling contained a political error.
118. Fu Yulin, supra note 24, at 39, 43-44.
119. See, e.g., Dana T. Blackmore, Eradicating the Long Standing Existence of a NoPrecedent Rule in International Trade Law-Looking Toward Stare Decisis in WTO Dispute
Settlement, 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG., 487, 498 (2004) ("A forty-six year study revealed
that, of the 4,000 German Federal Constitutional Court cases, it departed from precedent in fewer
than twelve cases."); Thomas Lundmark, InterpretingPrecedents: A Comparative Study, 46 AM.
J. CoMP. L. 211,215 (1998) (book review); Mei-Fei Kuo & Kai Wang, When Is an Innovation in
Order?: Justice Bader Ruth Ginsberg and Stare Decisis, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 835, 872 n.310

(1998).
120.

Fu Yulin, supra note 24, at 41.

121.

Id. at 39, 41, 43.
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system for small unappealable cases; the 1954 Court Organization
122
Law and Procedure Law created the present two-tier structure.
During the 1950s, strategies and formulas for success varied and
were experimental, ranging from a Soviet-style central planned
economy, copying Stalinist industrialization, to even copying the
judicial model and case law review model of the former Soviet
Union and its People's Courts. 123 Despite modem legal reforms, the
two-tier structure still operates in China and results in each court of
first instance being able to act as a court of final instance, from the
intermediate to higher courts. Such a system firmly embeds the
juridical practice of extra-constitutionalism in practice through trial
4
supervision procedures.
From the perspective of the CCP, extra-constitutionalism in
practice, such as trial supervision procedures, manifests a review
structure that enhances and supports the policies, goals, and actions
of the CCP. This is because the two-tier model intensifies extraprocedural control while also creating requisite scaled political
effects of correcting errors."' The two-tier model is mostly a product
of a political economy environment that demands the procedural
structure conform to the policies, actions, and goals of the CCP
rather than a procedural structure, such as an appeal, revision, and
cassation model, which gradually creates judicial precedents on a
case-by-case basis.
The state of extra-constitutionalism, in conjunction with recent
laws, regulations, and cases, also presents issues in the context of the
law in text-law in action dichotomy as well the rules on the paperpractical rules dichotomy--concepts or transplants from Western
12

122. Id. at 48; Nanping Liu, "Legal Precedents" with Chinese Characteristics:Published
Cases in the Gazette of the Supreme People's Court, 5 J. CHINESE L. 107, 108-12 (1991)
(noting that from the Qin Dynasty (221-206 B.C.) to Republic of China (1911-1949), there was
also a history of Western-style legal precedents).
123.

XIN REN, TRADITION OF THE LAW AND LAW OF THE TRADITION: LAW, STATE, AND

SOCIAL CONTROL INCHINA 4 (1997) ("[T]he Soviet law and legal system provided not only the
platform for the architecture of the Chinese socialist system of law but also the professional
training that enabled China to adapt the Soviet socialist model of law during the 1950s.").
124. Fu Yulin, supra note 24, at 43-49.
125. Id.; see Yardley, supra note 117. See also Philip P. Pan, The Unquiet Death of a
Chinese Peasant: Lenient Treatment for Driver in 'BMW Case' Ignites Media Frenzy, Wide
Discussion of Wealth and Justice, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2004, at A 14 (discussing how the party's
post-judgment intervention is to correct errors).
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jurisprudence that now possess distinctive Chinese characteristics.' 26
Admittedly, the transplantation of economic laws are usually less
controversial than constitutional, administrative, and other domestic
laws because economic laws address issues of efficiency, stability,
and predictability in the new global market or liberal market
economy. The transplantation of economic laws does not pose an
immediate threat, whether true or not, to a non-Western culture and
society. '27 The problem with the Chinese judiciary's ability to
safeguard liberty, including the norms of economic equality
prescribed by WTO standards, such as the non-discrimination norm
of most-favored-nations'28 treatment requiring equal treatment in
economic transactions, arises from the fact that liberty in terms of
Western constitutionalism constitutes negative liberty rather than
positive liberty. Consider for example the case of the pursuit of a
behavior laid down by one-party CCP rule and a self-chosen
rationale principle.
Independent judicial review addresses issues of substantive due
process rather than procedural due process or "the opportunity to be
heard . . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 29

Substantive due process constitutes individual liberty and poses a
threat to the CCP because it address both the government's power
and the protection of fundamental rights, as opposed to the
procedural due process safeguard of the right to be heard.'3 ° The
influence of Marxism continues to drive extra-constitutionalism in
126. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1911);
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962); ROSCOE
POUND, LAW AND MORALS (1926); Paul D. Carrington & Erika King, Law and the Wisconsin
Idea, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 297 (1997).
127. For examples of post-1979 transplantations by the legislature, see Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Minfa Tongze [General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China]
(promulgated by Order No. 37, President of the People's Republic of China, Apr. 12, 1986,
effective Jan. 1, 1987); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo She Wai Jingji He Fong Fa [Law of the
People's Republic of China on Economic Contracts Involving Foreign Interest] (promulgated by
Order No. 22, President of the People's Republic of China, Mar. 21, 1985). For examples of
controversial post-1979 transplantations by the judiciary, see Shengsi lianren de baoxian jiuge
(2003) (examining an insurance case involving a couple of dead lovers, the Intermediate People's
Court of Suzhou resolved such issues by referring to the American Uniform Simultaneous Death
Act). For more information about the rule of law, see HELEN YU & ALISON GUERNSEY, WHAT IS
THE RULE OF LAW? (2006).
128. GATT, supra note 11, art. I.
129. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citations omitted); accord Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
130. See Killion, supra note 46, at 447-54.
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practice, the distinctions between the constitution in text and
constitution in action, law in text and law in action, and rules on
paper and practical rules. Indeed, one party CCP rule is the greatest
barrier to fully implementing a modem state of legality.
Marxism continues to influence ongoing legal reforms because,
notwithstanding traditional culture and society and its prescriptive
meanings or normative norms. Marxism influences the growth and
development of China's socialist legal system, and even whether its
socialist legal system can experience growth and development. The
often-overlooked and primordial influence on modem legal reforms
is Marxism, or the ongoing process of attempting to finalize its
localization. The influence of Marxism, Leninism, Communism,
Socialism, or even Mao's Socialism, on modem legal reforms and
constitutionalism, ultimately, presents issues of reconstructing or
localizing orthodox Marxist legal theory or a Marxist legal system.
China presents itself to the international community as jointly
pursuing a socialist-political polity and capitalist-economic policy,
and herein lies an elemental problem of modem reforms."'
Many Western experts and authorities recognize a distinctive
Marxist legal theory or socialist jurisprudence.
Widely
representative of this group are Janet Campbell, Franz Neuman, and
even Carl Schmitt, who developed authoritarian, proto-fascist
theories. For instance, Janet Campbell attempts to show how a
socialist society could be a truly free society, or perhaps, implicitly, a
Marxian utopia.'32 In an analysis of Marxist legal theory, Campbell
draws from the historical development of legal theory grounded in
Marxist political economy from an earlier development of law in the
former Soviet Union and its people's courts.'33 For Campbell,
although a system of regulation in socialism may not be on par with
Western ideals of the rule of law, it still presents a viable alternative
that does not ignore the regulatory needs of society, which is also
compatible with the Marxist critique of the legal order.'34

131. See generally Killion, supra note 16 (discussing the role of Confucianism and capitalisteconomic reforms in China's transition to judicial independence).
132.

See JANET CAMPBELL, AN ANALYSIS OF LAW IN THE MARXIST TRADITION 77-102,

109-10, 118-20, 164-70, 207-23 (2003).
133. Id.
134. Id. at309-21.

Winter 2008]

CHINA 'S CONSTITUTION

Then there is the legal scholarship of Franz Neumann. 3 5 Due to
earlier cold war polarization in both ideology and international
relations, his earlier contributions during the 1940s and 1950s to
legal scholarship suffered a period of disfavor due to his defense of a
socialist version of the rule of law or libertarian socialist account of
the rule of law and individual rights.'36 His viewpoint situates
between Marxism and liberal democracy, and between authoritarian
state socialism (as led by Stalin's Soviet Union) and free-market
capitalism (dominated by U.S. strategic interests and McCarthyite
purges of un-American leftist).'37 Some contend that Neumann was
ahead of his time because his views espoused a third option between
unregulated capitalism and state socialism.'38
There is also the authoritarian, proto-fascist theory developed by
Carl Schmitt, a former Nazi jurist prosecuted during the 1947
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal.'39 Since 1985, and
posthumously, there has been a growing interest in his scholarship. 4 °
For Schmitt, liberalism promotes political-cultural pluralism and
open-ended discursive deliberation between competing perspectives
on the goals of public policy rather than decisive and preemptory
sovereign action that is unhindered by constitutional limitations,
which is needed to enforce the absolute value that a sovereign power
promotes as a substantive principle of homogeneity. 4 ' Schmitt
deems liberals to overemphasize legality when they attempt to avoid

135. See, e.g., MARTIN JAY, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION: A HISTORY OF THE
FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 1923-1950 (1973); FRANZ
NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM 1933-1944

(1972); Michael Salter, Neo-FascistLegal Theory on Trial: An Interpretation of Carl Schmitt's
Defence at Nurembergfrom the Perspective of Franz Neumann's Critical Theory of Law, 5 RES
PUBLICA 161 (1999); Keith Tribe, Introduction to Neumann: Law and Socialist PoliticalTheory,
10 ECON. & SOC'Y 316 (1981).
136. Salter, supra note 135, at 161.
137. Id. at 167.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 161-62.
140. See, e.g., Christian J. Emden, The Brilliant Fascist? Carl Schmitt and the Limits of
Liberalism, H-GERMAN
(2005)
(book
review),
http://www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/
showrev.cgi?path=298891122323542 (reviewing four publications that attempt to elucidate Carl
Schmitt's intellectual career).
141.

See DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN

AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR (1997) (discussing competing Weimar era legal theories of
Schmitt, Kelsen, and Heller); CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY
(Ellen Kennedy trans., MIT Press 1985) (discussing inconsistencies of liberal democracy).
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political decisions in their quest for a precisely organized system of
42
legal rules.
A critical component of Schmitt's theory is that a sovereignty
does not lie in a system of principles, but rather it lies in the power to
make exceptions to customary legalities to address emergencies
143
because a primary function of the sovereignty is to preserve order.
His inversions are authoritarian, especially when reducing principles
of constitutionality to a secondary expression of sovereign power,
which is independently constituted by non-rational brute force and an
unaccountable decision. 144 The latter establishes the fundamental
nature of the legal order of a liberal state, and therefore cannot be
held accountable to the content of merely derivative constitutional
norms. 145 Schmitt's decisionism reduces legal authority, which is
relegated by rule of law, to an instrumental form of sovereign
power.

46

Schmitt's legal theory is both problematic and dangerous,
because before and after the Nazi era, "anti-Semitism" was the core
of his theory. 147 For instance, the post-1985 resurgent interests in his
theories coincided with a re-emergence of "the radical right," as a
distinctive political force.
This resurgence, especially on the
European continent, is finding outlets in nationalistic expressions of
"ethnic cleaning" against groups standing outside racial, ethnic, and
religious definitions of homogeneity; 4 1 i.e., anti-Semitism, antiBlack racism, and anti-immigration sentiment. A danger attaches to
the re-interpretation of the very existence of these groups within
national borders as a threat. As a courtesy of Schmitt's theory,
proto-fascist theories still present an ever-present danger to modem
society. So long as "civil libertarian appeals to preserve democratic
values of accountability, transparency and openness to maximum
participation in the exercise of public and private power fail to gain
142. David Gordon, Book Review, 6 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 117 (1992) (reviewing PAUL
EDWARD GOTrFRIED, CARL SCHMITT: POLITICS AND THEORY (1990)).
143. Id. at 118.
144. Salter, supra note 134, at 164.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147.

RAPHAEL GROSS ET AL, CARL SCHMITT AND THE JEWS: THE "JEWISH QUESTION," THE

HOLOCAUST, AND GERMAN LEGAL THEORY (2007) (discussing Schmitt's anti-Semitism before
and after the Nazi era-as the core of his theory).
148. Salter, supra note 134, at 162.
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and sustain majority support amongst those both exercising and
subject to such power,"'49 fascistic reconstructions of governments
and their institutions remain a possibility. A Nazi regime was able to
rely upon support from both legal practitioners and academians,
including Schmitt, and from sources outside the legal profession. 5 °
The greatest danger of Schmitt's legal theory lies in the potential reemergence of the same or different version of Fascism.
However, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, as economic
determinists, deemed law to be superfluous in a socialist utopia and
law. 5' They believed that law played a limited role in the transition
from capitalism to communism because they perceived law in a
capitalist society to be a tool of the elite bourgeoisie.' 52 The driving
forces of social, political, and economic life were the contradictions
in material or economic life, because they arise from a conflict
between the social forces of production and the relations of
production-the class and property relations of society-within
which these productive forces have developed.'53 Law suffers
relegation to just another ideological form for which Marx foretold
that once men become conscious of this conflict, they will fight it out
because economic relations and changing economic circumstances
primarily shape law. Thus, law is one of many areas of class
struggles that must be fought out.' 54 Law, like other social
phenomena, is subject to Marx and Engel's dialectical materialist
analysis, which examined the interaction between the economic base
of society and the ideological superstructure.
Engels compared the French Civil Code (Code civil des
franqais) and Roman law with English and Prussian law.'55 For
Engels, because of the 1789 Revolution, if economic relations
determine state and public law, then private law only sanctions
existing economic relations between individuals.'56 Engels deems

149. Emden, supra note 139.
150. Id.
151.
152.
153.
154.

PAUL PHILLIPS, MARX AND ENGELS ON LAW AND LAWS 186-223 (1980).
Id.
Id.
Id.

155.

FRIEDRICH ENGELS, LUDWIG FEUERBACH AND THE END OF THE CLASSICAL GERMAN

PHILOSOPHY (Univ. Press of the Pac. 2005) (1886).
156. Id.
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this a possibility in various forms. He even saw such developments
in England, which occurred in sync with its national development by
mostly retaining vestiges of feudal laws and giving them a bourgeois
content.157

At the close of the great revolution, it was possible for such a
class law code of bourgeois society like the French Code Civile to be
worked out on the basis of Roman law. 58 Engels writes, "If,
therefore, bourgeois legal rules merely express the economic life
conditions of society in legal form, then they do so well or ill
according to circumstances."' 59 This materialist concept generally
guides Marxists in evaluating the role that law plays in a Marxist or
Communist society, as equally true in the preceding formation of
social and economic life. 6
Marx foretells of abolishing the old state apparatus and its
replacement by a more egalitarian and democratic state. Marx
suggested that this would occur when the working class took power
and commenced building Socialism as the first stage of the transition
from Socialism to Communism, thus producing the end of the
nation-state and creating a worker's paradise or utopia. 6 ' For Marx
and Engels, the state would wither away when Communism was
achieved.'62 This is the point in society when the productive forces
of man had developed and had been rationally planned to a state,
when scarcity and inequality were eliminated, including the struggle
for individual existence.'63 In this utopia, there will no longer be
private or conflicting ownership of the productive forces; the social
inequality of capitalism will have been overcome; and the majority
of working people will have become accustomed to administering
their own affairs and those of society, without the need for legal and
physical coercion."
If China's polity, the CCP, is attempting to finalize the
localization of Marxism, then modem legal reforms and
157. Id.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.

Id.

Id.
See KARL MARX, COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (Henry Regnery Co. 1950) (1848).
162. See id. at 23-34.
163. Seeid.
164. See id. at 24-27.
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constitutionalism remain wholly or partially contingent upon an
institutional analysis of a Marxian framework or Marxist political
economy. A primary concern of Marxist political economy is the
subject of the relations of production because productive forces
necessarily determine the relations of production.'65
In modem China, a starting point and theory of analysis is
Marxist political economy, which continues to serve as a theoretical
tool and framework in the fundamental analysis of economic
institutions as well as corresponding political and legal institutions.' 66
It is institutional economics serving as a theoretical system in the
analysis of social, political, and legal institutions, and many other
philosophical forms.'6 7 In terms of Marxist institutional analysis, the

most critical theory is the elemental institutional analysis derived
from the premises that productive forces determine production
relations, economic foundation decides superstructures (or society's
institutions and ideas) and a core segment that covers the social
division of labor.' 68 The problems become increasingly obvious
when one considers Marxist political economy as driving
institutional research and institutional analysis and as serving as the
primordial force providing an explanatory system for institutional
phenomena.'69 The consequences are obvious, especially in terms of
the 1978 promise of legal reforms and democracy.
In terms of the institutional analysis of a Marxist framework or
Marxist political economy, critical components of Marxist analysis
or economic determinism are the economic base of society and the
superstructure, with the latter comprising the social, political, legal,
and religious institutions, including other philosophical forms. 7°

165. See 5 KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, The German Ideology, in KARL MARX &
FREDERICK ENGELS COLLECTED WORKS 1845-1847, at 19 (Int'l Publishers 1976).
166. See Sun Hui, Marx's Ontology and Its Significance in Our Times-A Survey of the
Second Marxist Philosophical Form, ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE [SOC. SCI. CHINA], Spring
2003, at 29.
167. Zou Shipeng, supra note 8, at 17.
168. Id.
169. Id.; Jiang Shigong, Towards a Jurisprudence of Legislators-A Reflective Look at
Contemporary Jurisprudence Against the Backdrop of Law Transplantation, ZHONGGUO SHEHUI
KEXUE [SOC. SCI. CHINA], Summer 2005, at 61.
170. NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (Martin Albrow ed., Elizabeth
King & Martin Albrow trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985); 5 MARX & ENGELS, supra note
164.
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Marx, when setting forth a clear exposition of his materialistic
conception of history, writes,
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably
enter into definite relations which are independent of their
will; namely relations of production appropriate to a stage
in the development of their material given fares of
production. The totality of these relations of production
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real
foundation, on which arises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of
social consciousness. The mode of production of material
life conditions the general process of social, political and
171
intellectual life.
For Karl Marx, although the superstructure is an important factor, the
economic base is the fundamental and exclusive causal influence
because the economic base is the fundamental and exclusive causal
72
influence in his materialistic conception of history.
There are, admittedly, controversies regarding how to define the
superstructure, and even how to measure its attendant influence on
social, political, legal, religious, artistic, and other philosophical
forms comprising the superstructure. 7 1
Orthodox Marxism
maintains that the superstructure, such as the political, legal,
74
religious, and other philosophical forms, has no causal influence.'
This is because the economic base is an all-encompassing causal
influence, constituting both the forces and relations of production.'75
Some sources will, simply, limit the role of the economic base to the
relations of production.'76 Other sources, perhaps representing a
minority viewpoint or even unorthodox Marxists, argue that the
superstructure serves as a superficial cause rather than a fundamental
cause in Marx's materialistic conception of history. 77 Some sources
171. KARL MARX, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 20-21
(Maurice Dobb ed., S.W. Ryzamskaya trans., Int'l Publishers 1970) (1859).
172. ALEX CALLINICOS, MAKING HISTORY: AGENCY, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN SOCIAL
THEORY 173 (1988); GERALD ALLAN COHEN, KARL MARX'S THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENCE
216 (Princeton Univ. Press 1978) (2000); 5 MARX & ENGELS, supra note 165, at 53-54.
173. COHEN, supra note 171, at 216.
174. 5 MARX & ENGELS, supra note 165, at 53-54.
175. COHEN, supra note 171, at 217.
176. Id.
177. CALLINICOS, supra note 171, at 173-75.
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even suggest that Marx recognized a historical superficial influence,
if not causal influence, of the superstructure in early Western
civilization, such as the influence of politics in ancient Greece and
Rome, and even Catholicism during the Middle Ages.'78 However,
antithetically, by virtue of Marx's materialistic conception of history,
the superstructure of neither politics, nor religion, could ever rise to
the same level or prominence in modern society.'79
An elemental problem of Marxist analysis is that the economic
base gives rise to the superstructure, thereby presenting the
phenomenon of the base conditioning the superstructure, or social,
political, legal, religious, artistic, and other philosophical forms once
it comes into existence. 8 ° Even assuming a superficial influence of
the superstructure, advocacy of a superficial role of the
superstructure, in essence, challenges Marx's materialistic
conception of history. In terms of Marx's materialistic conception of
history, any role assigned to the superstructure, such as even a
superficial influence, ultimately challenges the economic base as the
fundamental and exclusive causal influence, thereby arguably
rendering Marx's theory of history as a false doctrinaire. A
persistent problem of Marxism is that the economic base conditions
the superstructure by limiting its development.'
This most
importantly includes limiting the development of constitutionalism,
rule of law, and independent judicial review.
Moreover, the economic determinism of the institutional
analysis of a Marxist framework or Marxist political economy, and
its basic tenet that the economic base of society is the fundamental
and exclusive causal influence, must theoretically deny that a body
of law or system of law contains a built-in mechanism for organic
change.'
A problem of a Marxist political economy is economic
determinism, which heavily weighs against a body of law or rule of
law being reflective of a living law, especially a legal system
primarily focused on enacting new legal propositions or laws, though

178.
179.
180.
(1983).
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
ALEX CALLINICOS, THE REVOLUTIONARY IDEAS OF KARL MARX 97 (Bookmarks 2004)
Id. at 95-96.
Berman, supra note 56, at 1654.
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impossible to cover all legal relations, and not a natural evolution
and development of law.'83 Eugen Ehrlich wrote,
To attempt to imprison the law of a time or of a people
within the sections of a code is about as reasonable as to
attempt to confine a stream within a pond. The water that is
put in the pond is no longer a living stream but a stagnant
pool, and but little water can be put in the pond....
8
It could not be otherwise.

4

Despite classical legal positivism and its attendant command
theory,185 which is the only, though tenuous, means 8 6 of justifying a
Marxist-inspired legal system that primarily focuses on enacting new
legal propositions or laws, legal propositions that are void of
prescriptive meanings and the norms of a culture and society do not
present a complete picture of the state of the law. They tell us
neither what the "law is," nor what it "should be."' 87
A problem is an earlier displacement of traditional culture,
traditional government, traditional political theory, and traditional
jurisprudence because these institutions and philosophical forms
from antiquity actually demonstrate greater vestiges of democratic
government than modern China's one-party CCP rule.'88 For Joseph
de Maistre and the divine origins of constitutions, the fundamental

183. EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 487 (Walter
L. Moll trans., Russell & Russell Inc. 1962) (1936).
184. Id. at 488.
185. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Prometheus Books
2000) (1832) (discussing that a proposition of law was true if it simply reported correctly the past
commands of a political society and defining positive law as commands from the government or a
command issued by a sovereign); see also HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 67-68, 105-07,
138-39 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (1934) ( "The function of the science of
law is not the evaluation of its subject but its value-free description.").
186. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 35 (1986) ("Many officials of Nazi Germany
obeyed Hitler's commands as law, but only out of fear. Does that mean they accepted a rule of
recognition entitling him to make law? If so, then the difference between Hart's theory and
Austin's becomes elusive, because there would then be no difference between a group of people
accepting a rule of recognition and simply falling into a self-conscious pattern of obedience out of
fear.").
187. EHRLICH, supra note 182, at 488; H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2nd ed. 1994)
(1961) (discussing how Hart's Rule of Recognition assigns a particular person or group the
authority to make law because rules of law are true not, just in virtue of commands, but in virtue
of social conventions representing the community's acceptance of rules empowering the creation
of valid law).
188. CH'IEN MU, TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENT IN IMPERIAL CHINA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
121, 142 (Chiin-tu Hsdieh & George 0. Totten trans., 1982).
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principles of a political constitution and constitutional law "exist
before all written law," as the development of "an unwritten preexisting right" that is "intrinsically constitutional, and truly
fundamental," but "never written, and could not be, without
endangering the state"; and "the weakness and fragility of a
constitution are actually in direct proportion to the multiplicity of
written constitutional articles."' 8 9 The latter propositions serve as a
reminder of the dangers of constitutionalizing party ideologies, and
the dangers of a constitution that affirms or demands compliance to
The greatest folly of both "old" Marxism
party ideology.9
(orthodox or classical Marxism) and "new" Marxism (modem, neoclassical or localized Marxism) is an earlier and continuing
displacement of traditional culture and society (predominantly
traditional Confucianism) as a prominent philosophical form, in
antiquity and modernity.
When confronting a modem Confucian culture and society, a
Marxist-inspired constitution or state of legality does not measure up
to either natural law theory, and its primordial concern of what law
"ought to be," or modem legal positivism, and its retrospective
concern with what law "ought to be."19' 1 A Marxist-inspired
constitution produces the contagion effects of amoral, apolitical, and
atheoretical proclivities of classical legal positivism.192 This is
because such a constitution must, by virtue of an institutional
analysis within a Marxist framework, deny the validity of
prescriptive meanings or normative norms of a Confucian culture
and society, as the Chinese communists have done so since the
1920s. As previously mentioned, positive law in antiquity presented
a built-in mechanism for organic change. As such, like Western
culture and its philosophical forms from Plato's rejection of law as
coercive power, to Romans and Roman jurisconsults that associated
the Law of Nations (Jus Gentium) with the Law of Nature, to the
189. Joseph de Maistre, Essay on the Generative Principleof Political Constitutions and of
Other Human Institutions, in THE WORKS OF JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, 147, 152 (Jack Lively ed.,
1965) (1809).
190. Suna Kili, Problems of the Application of Contemporary Constitutions, in MODERN
CONSTITUTION 117, 131-32 (Thomas Fleiner-Gerster ed., 1988).
191. See Berman, supra note 56, at 1653-55.
192. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics:International
Society, Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim's Positive InternationalLaw, 13 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 401,426 (2002) (discussing Oppenheim's view of positive as normative).
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Enlightenment philosophies (Age of Reason, 1660-1798), positive
law had the capacity and capability of experiencing a historical
growth and evolutionary development.1 3 Positive law in antiquity
with growth and development, unlike Marxist-inspired legality, was
more capable of reflecting genuine prescriptive meanings of a
Confucian culture and society. Such meanings include norms
reflective of Confucian morality or even requisite constitutional
ethos for a Confucian culture and society, in both antiquity and
modernity.'94 Positive law in antiquity, like modem legal positivism,
also possessed greater capability of responding to the unique
juridical needs. Such needs that included prescriptive meanings or
normative norms, of a Confucian culture and society, in both
antiquity and modemity, which is a retrospective concern with what
law "ought to be."' 95
A Marxist-inspired constitution only compares to an extreme
form of classical legal positivism and not modem legal positivism.
Modem China's state of legality produced a body of rules laid down
and enforced by the CCP and its agents of coercive power, from the
NPC, to the Supreme People's Court. Both coercive power and
legitimacy are problematic because "[m]ost positivists do not deny
that law ought to serve moral ends, the ends of justice, but argue that
what law is, is a political instrument, a body of rules manifesting the
policies of the legitimately constituted political authorities."' 96 For a
Marxist-inspired constitution, in both action and text, and its
attendant "people's democratic dictatorship," the problem will
always be the lack of a body of rules laid down and enforced by a
sovereign, a legitimately constituted political authority."'
A
Marxist-inspired constitution or state of legality dictates extremist
positivism in the construct of a legal system. Such a constitution
193. See EHRLICH, supra note 182, at 487-88; POUND, supra note 125, at 1-15; Berman,
supra note 56, at 1652-55; see also SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS
CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS

(1930); Wan Junren, ContrastingConfucian Virtue Ethics and Maclntyre's Aristotelian Virtue
Theory, ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE [SOC. SCI. CHINA], Summer 2003, at 37 (contrasting
Confucian values with Western values).
194. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 169 (1987)
(describing the United States Constitution as a fundamental ethos).
195. Berman, supra note 56, at 1653.
196. Id. at 1653.
197. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 36, at 124 (discussing how each, by giving his vote gives his
opinion on this question, and the counting of votes yields a declaration of the general will).
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thus evades the discipline of modem legal positivism and is
incapable, in terms of prescriptive meanings or normative norms, of
adequately responding to the needs and particularities of a modem
Confucian culture and society.
The continuing influence of Marxism, continuing displacement
of traditional culture and society, and a policy of pursuing minimum
compliance with the WTO rules and standards for sound legal
systems, including judicial review, hinders Chinese constitutionalism
or "building up the constitution." Western experts and authority,
anticipate that non-Western and traditional legal systems, including
Marxist-legal systems, will be surpassed by a more modern Western
legal system as pursuant to the WTO rules and standards. China
nonetheless commits "some" resources for "some" legal reforms,
such as "some" new legal propositions or laws. China does so for
purposes of meeting its baseline WTO Protocol on Accession
requirements, and participating in the new global market or liberal
market economy. This policy of pursuing minimum compliance with
the WTO Protocol on Accession, the WTO rules and TPRM is a byproduct of China's polity, the CCP, continuing to hail Marxism as its
official ideology, and hailing Marxism and its Marxian analysis as
the primordial force providing an explanatory system for institutional
phenomena.'98
Ultimately, notwithstanding an amendment of the WTO rules,
successful legal reforms promoted by the WTO rules, or greater
borrowing from Western constitutional models due to institutional
admiration,'99 Marxism, as a theoretical construct, must deny the
influence of prescriptive meanings or normative norms of a culture
and society in the construct of a legal system containing a body of
law or system of law with a built-in mechanism for organic change.
Marxian analysis wholly, or in part, confines the development of the
superstructure, and the philosophical forms of constitutionalism, rule
The most obvious
of law and independent judicial review.
consequence of attempting to finalize the localization of Marxism to
the realities of traditional culture and society is the denial of both
prescriptive meanings or norms of culture and society, as well as the

198. See Jiang Shigong, supra note 13, at 160-61; Zou Shipeng, supra note 8, at 12.
199. Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin
Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383, 389 (2003).
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WTO rules and standards for sound legal systems as causal
influences on legal reforms and constitutionalism, or "building up the
constitution."
The influence of Marxism on the growth and
development of constitutionalism, rule of law, and independent
judicial review is a confining one. This substantiates Fareed
Zakaria's thesis that, historically, rule of law and a liberal market
economy precede liberal democracy and universal suffrage because
rule of law can only be the result of an evolution of legal systems,
and not the starting point. °°
IV.

CONCLUSION

A problem for those proponents advocating an increasing role of
the superstructure as a causal influence is that such advocacy
essentially renders Marx's materialistic conception of history as a
false doctrinaire and thus fails the promise of a future Marxist utopia.
The inevitable consequence for China, the CCP, and its citizenry is
that it renders the attempt to finalize the localization of Marxism to
the realities of traditional culture and society as meaningless, or
simply, it renders the final reduction of Marxism to a nugatory
"ism." This renders Marxist legal theory or socialist jurisprudence
an incorrect path to modem reforms as well as an influence on
modem legal reforms not deserving institutional admiration,
especially as the primordial force providing an explanatory system
for institutional phenomena.201 This is instead of a path to modem
legal reforms that promote a variant of the Western model of a state
of legality or constitutional state, such as the Anglo-American rule of
law, German Rechtsstaatand French bat de droit.
As Eugen Ehrlich succinctly observed, "The various legal
propositions as such, the legal institutions divorced from their
presuppositions, have no information to convey."2 2 This is because
if there is a unifying regularity in the phenomenon of legal life, it can
only be found in the fact that legal life is conditioned upon the social
and economic constitution and not the fundamental and exclusive
200. See generally FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY

AT HOME AND ABROAD (2003) (discussing the evolution of liberal democracy from Roman
Emperor Constantine to the American colonies).
201. See Jiang Shigong, supra note 13, at 169; see also Zou Shipeng, supra note 8 (discussing
the Chinese localization of Marxism and its effects on modem China).
202. ERHLICH, supra note 182, at 475-76.
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causal influence of economic determinism. Borrowing from the
words of Xu Zhangrun when he was translating a thesis of the late
eminent scholar Liang Shuming (1893-1988):
[Liang Shuming] wished to find a way out of the holistic
crisis for his homeland, to establish a home for the mind by
creating a new life for the Chinese people and Chinese
hopefully
could
Physis [nature]
where
society
accommodate Nomos [law] compatibly and competently;
where the transcendent source of meaning and humane
feeling, founded upon a new basis, could be reintegrated
and reflected into rules of law as a whole. °3
For these reasons, ideal constitutionalism, rule of law, and
independent judicial review can only be the result of an evolution of
legal systems. They cannot be the starting point, 2° as the CCP has
attempted to do by simply committing "some" resources for "some"
legal reforms.

203. Xu Zhangrun, Western Law in China: Transplantation or Transformation-FourCases

and Liang Shuming's Responses, ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE [SOC. SCI. CHINA], Autumn 2004, at
134, 147.
204. See ZAKARIA, supra note 199.
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